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Boom – Busts in Asset Prices, Economic Instability, and Monetary Policy
1 




The link between monetary policy and asset price movements has been of perennial 
interest to policy makers. The 1920s stock market boom and 1929 crash and the 1980s 
Japanese asset bubble are two salient examples where asset price reversals were followed by 
protracted recessions and deflation.
2 The key questions that a rise from these episodes is 
whether the monetary authorities could have been more successful in preventing the 
consequences of an asset market bust or whether it was appropriate for the authorities only to 
react to these events ex post.  
 
  In this paper we consider the potential cases for proactive versus reactive monetary 
policy based on the situation where asset price reversals can have serious effects on real output.  
Our analysis is based on a stylized model of the dilemma with which the monetary authorities 
are faced in asset price booms. On the one hand, letting the boom go unchecked entails the risk 
that it will be followed by a bust, accompanied by a  collateral induced credit crunch. 
Restricting monetary policy can be thought of as an insurance against the risk of a credit 
crunch. On the other hand, this insurance does not come free: restricting monetary policy 
implies immediate costs in terms of lower output and inflation. The optimal monetary policy 
depends on the relative cost and benefits of the insurance.
3 
 
Although the model is quite stylized, we find that the optimal monetary policy depends on the 
economic conditions—including the private sector’s beliefs—in a rather complex way. 
Broadly speaking, a proactive monetary restriction is the optimal policy when the risk of a bust 
is large and the monetary authorities can defuse it at a relatively low cost. One source of 
difficulty is that in general, there is a tension between these two conditions. As investors 
become more exuberant, the risks associated with a reversal in market sentiment increase. At 
the same time, leaning against the wind of investors’ optimism requires more radical and costly 
monetary actions. To be optimal, a proactive monetary policy must come into play at a time 
                                                             
1 For valuable research assistance we thank Priya Joshi. 
2 Other recent episodes of asset price booms and collapses include experiences in the 1980s 
and 1990s in the Nordic Countries, Spain, Latin America and East Asia, see e.g. Schinasi and 
Hargreaves (1993); Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1998); IMF World Economic Outlook (2000); 
and Collyns and Senhadji (2002). 
3 It is important to note that we do not address the case where asset price movements act as 
predictors of future inflation. The evidence on this issue is mixed (see Filardo 2000).   - 4 - 
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when the risk is perceived as sufficiently large but the authorities’ ability to act is not too 
diminished. 
 
Another, more difficult question is whether (and when) the conditions for a proactive monetary 
policy are met in the real world. We view this question as very much open and deserving 
further empirical research. In the meantime, we present in this paper some stylized facts on 
asset booms and busts that have some bearing on the issue. We find that historically, there have 
been many booms and busts in asset prices, but that they have different features depending on 
the countries and whether one looks at stock or property prices. Boom-bust episodes seem to 
be more frequent in real property prices than in stock prices, and in small countries than in 
large countries. However, two dramatic episodes (the US in the Great Depression and Japan in 
the 1990s) have involved large countries and the stock market. We also present evidence that 
busts are associated with disruption in financial and real activity (banking crises, slowdown in 
output and decreasing inflation). 
 
This paper is related to growing policy and academic literatures on monetary policy and asset 
prices. On the policy side, the dominant view among central bankers is that in response to 
movements in asset prices, monetary policy should be reactive, not proactive, e.g. 
 
“[…] the general view nowadays is that central banks should not try to use interest rate policy 
to control asset price trends by seeking to burst any bubbles that may form. The normal 
strategy is rather to seek, firmly and with the help of a great variety of instruments, to restore 
stability on the few occasions when asset markets collapse.” 
 
(Ms Hessius, Deputy Governor of the Sveriges Risksbank, BIS Review 128/1999). 
 
This view is vindicated, on the academic side, by the recent work of Bernanke and Gertler 
(2000). These authors argue that a central bank dedicated to price stability should pay no 
attention to asset prices per se, except insofar as they signal changes in expected inflation. 
These results stem from the simulation of different variants of the Taylor rule in the context of 
a new keynesian model with sticky wages and a financial accelerator. Bernanke and Gertler 
also argue that trying to stabilize asset prices  per se is problematic because it i s nearly 
impossible to know for sure whether a given change in asset values results from fundamental 
factors, non-fundamental factors, or both.  
 
In another study, Cecchetti et al (2000)  have argued in favor of a more proactive 
response of monetary policy to asset prices. They agree with Bernanke and Gertler that the 
monetary authorities would have to make an assessment of the bubble component in asset 
prices, but take a more optimistic view of the feasibility of this task.
4 They also argue, on the 
basis of simulations of the Bernanke-Gertler model, that including an asset price variable (e.g. 
stock prices) in the Taylor rule would be desirable. Bernanke and Gertler (2001) attribute the 
latter findings to the use of a misleading metric in the comparison between policy rules. 
                                                             
4 Assessing the bubble component in asset prices should not be qualitatively more difficult, 
they argue, than measuring the output gap, an unobservable variable which many central banks 
use as an input into policymaking.   - 5 - 
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Our approach differs from these in several respects. First, we view the emphasis on 
bubbles in this debate as excessive. In our model the monetary authority needs to ascertain the 
risk of an asset price reversal but it is not essential whether the reversal reflects a bursting 
bubble or fundamentals. Non-fundamental influences may exacerbate the volatility of asset 
prices and thus complicate the monetary authorities’ task, but they are not of the essence of the 
question. Even if asset markets were completely efficient, abrupt price reversals could occur, 
and pose the same problem for monetary authorities as bursting bubbles.  
 
Second, we find that the optimal policy rule is unlikely to take the form of a Taylor 
rule, even if it is augmented by a linear term in asset prices. If there is scope for proactive 
monetary policy, it is highly contingent on a number of factors for which output, inflation and 
the current level of asset prices do not provide appropriate summary statistics. It depends on 
the risks in the balance sheets of private agents assessed by reference to the risks in asset 
markets. The balance of these risks cannot be summarized in two or three macroeconomic 
variables, and it is shifting over time.  
 
More generally, our analysis points to the risks of using simple monetary policy rules 
as the guide for monetary policy. These rules are blind to the fact that financial instability is 
endogenous—to some extent, and in a complex way—to monetary policy. The linkages 
between asset prices, financial instability and monetary policy are complex because they are 
inherently non-linear, and involve extreme (tail probability) events. The complexity of these 
linkages does not imply, however, that they can be safely ignored. Whether they like it or not, 
the monetary authorities need to take a stance that involves some judgment over the probability 
of extreme events. As our model illustrates, the optimal stance cannot be characterized by a 
simple rule.  If anything, our analysis emphasizes the need for some discretionary judgment in 
monetary policy. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. As background to the analysis, Section 2 reviews 
some of the salient features of two famous episodes of asset price reversals associated with 
extreme economic distress: the Interwar Great Depression experience of the U.S. and the 
Japanese asset price boom and bust in the 1980s and 1990s. In section 3 we present stylized 
facts on boom and bust cycles in asset prices in the post 1970 experience of 15 OECD 
countries. Section 4 presents the model and discusses policy implications. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
Section 2. Historical Perspectives: Two dramatic episodes 
 
 
  Asset price reversals have been an important phenomenon since the dawn of capitalism. 
Classic examples of a boom-bust cycle were the tulip mania in the early seventeenth century 
(Garber 2000) and the South Sea bubble in England in the early eighteenth century 
(Kindleberger 1989). In this section, as historical background to our analysis, we document the 
two most dramatic episodes of asset price reversals of the twentieth century: the 1929 U.S. 
stock market crash and the Japanese “asset price bubble” of the late 1980s and early 1990’s. In 
both of these episodes asset price reversals played a major role in precipitating severe 
recessions.    - 6 - 
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2.1 The U.S. 1929-1933 
 
 
  The Great Contraction in the U.S 1929-1933 is often associated with a classic boom 
and bust episode in the stock market  (see figure 1). The boom, focussed on the ‘new economy’ 
stocks such as GE and RCA, according to legend began in 1926, turned into a bubble in March 
1928 which burst on October 24, 1929 (Galbraith 1958, Kindleberger 1987). The bottom was 
not reached until 1932. The boom,  which some argue was fueled by expansionary Federal 
Reserve policy in the spring of 1927, was financed by easy bank credit (see figure 3) and 
brokers loans (White 1990). The bust, it is sometimes argued was triggered by tight Federal 
Reserve policy in 1929 to prick what they perceived as a stock market bubble (Friedman and 
Schwartz 1963). 
 
Beginning in late 1927 the Federal Reserve Board favored a policy of  moral suasion to  
discourage  member banks from financing stock market speculation, an activity viewed as 
anathema to the prevailing ‘real bills’ doctrine. This policy was opposed by Benjamin Strong, 
President of the New York Fed and head of the influential Open Market Investment Committee 
and after he became seriously ill and died in October 1928, by his successor George Harrison.  
They advocated a rise in the discount rate as the method to stem speculation. The stalemate, 
which it is argued allowed the stock market boom to continue unchecked,  lasted until August 
1929, the cyclical peak, when the discount rate was raised from 5 to 6 percent ( Meltzer 2002).  
 
The ensuing stock market crash in October 1929 in which stock prices declined by 
40 percent in two months (see Figure 1) is not generally viewed as the key cause of the severity 
of the contraction that followed but as having some impact on household wealth, expenditures 
on consumer durables and expectations (Romer 1992). The source of the subsequent 
depression in 1930-33 was a series of banking panics, which led to a collapse in money supply, 
financial intermediation and aggregate demand (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, Bernanke 
1983). 
 
Asset price deflation however was an important ingredient in the propagation of the 
Great Contraction (Bernanke and Gertler 1989) because declining asset prices (both stock 
prices and land prices, see Figures 1 and 2) reduced the value of bank loans and collateral (see 
Figure 3); weakened banks in turn dumped their loans and securities in fire sales leading to 
further asset price deflation. In this environment of massive bank failures, greatly reduced 
collateral, and negligible bank lending, financial intermediation seized up, significantly 
exacerbating the distress of the real economy. Especially hard hit by the plunge in asset prices 
were savings and loan associations whose assets were pummeled by the decline in real estate 
prices and delinquent mortgage payments. Life insurance companies were also hard hit. If their 
mortgages and bonds had been marked to market, most companies would have been insolvent 
(White 2000).
5 
                                                             
5 Deflation was also an important ingredient in the Great Depression. Its role is well described 
by Irving Fisher’s debt deflation story (Fisher 1933) in which collapsing prices led to a rise in 
debt burdens in an environment where contracts were not fully indexed. Deflation reduced the 





The recovery began on March 1933 after the Banking Holiday and massive reflation 
following the devaluation of the dollar and Treasury gold and silver purchase programs 
(Romer 1990).  The real economy however took close to a decade to recover to its pre-
depression level of activity and may have taken longer in the absence of World War II. Asset 




2.2 Japan 1986–1995 
 
  The Japanese boom- bust cycle began in the mid 1980’s with a run-up of real estate prices 
(see figure 4) fueled by an increase in bank lending (figure 6) and easy monetary policy. The 
property price boom in turn led to a stock market boom (figure 5) as the increased value of 
property owned by firms raised future profits and hence stock prices (Iwaisako and Ito 1995). Both 
rising land prices and stock prices in turn increased firms’ collateral encouraging further bank 
loans and more fuel for the boom. The bust may have been triggered, like the U.S. example 
60 years earlier, by the Bank of Japan’s pursuit of a tight monetary policy in 1989 to stem the asset 
market boom. 
   
  The subsequent asset price collapse in the next 5 years led to a collapse in bank lending 
with a decline in the collateral backing corporate loans (see figure 6). The decline in asset prices 
further i mpinged on the banking system’s capital making many banks insolvent. This occurred 
largely because the collapse in asset prices reduced the value of their capital (in Japan commercial 
banks could hold their capital in the form of stock market equity, see Kanaya and Woo 2000, 
Bayoumi and Collyns 2000). 
 
  Lender of last resort policy prevented a classic banking panic as had occurred in the U.S. in 
the 1930’s but regulatory forbearance has propped up insolvent banks. The banking crisis has yet 
to be resolved, bank lending remains moribund, and Japan 13 years after the bust is still mired in 
stagnation and deflation in the face of tight monetary policy and the slow resolution of bank in 
solvencies. Thus in the Japanese case because of tight connections between asset prices, collateral, 
bank lending and banking capital, the boom bust episode has been crucially intertwined with 








                                                                                                                                                                                                 
insolvency for both firms and banks. Declining real activity also reduced collateral by 
weakening the performance of assets.   - 8 - 
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Section 3.  Identifying booms and busts in asset prices: The Post-war OECD 
 
  Many countries have experienced asset price booms and busts since 1973. Although none 
were as dramatic as the U.S. and Japan cases, a number were followed by serious recessions. In 
this section we develop a methodology to delineate boom and bust cycles in asset prices. We apply 
this methodology to real annual stock and residential  property price indexes for 15 countries: 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 






  This section presents a criterion to ascertain whether movements in an asset price 
represents a boom or bust. A good criterion should be simple, objective and yield plausible results. 
In particular, it should select the notorious boom-bust episodes, such as the Great Depression in 
the U.S. or Japan 1986-1995, without producing (too many) spurious episodes. We found that the 
following criterion broadly satisfied these conditions—although it certainly is not the only one.  
 
Our criterion compares a moving average of the growth rate in asset prices with the long-run 
historical average. Let  ( ) 1 / log 1 , , , - = - t i t i t i P P g  be the growth rate in the real price of the asset 
(stock prices or property prices) in year t and in country i. Let  g be the average growth rate 
over all countries. Let  v be the volatility (standard deviation) in the growth rate  g, also 
measured by aggregating all of the countries together. 
 
Then if the average growth rate between year t-3 and year t is larger than a threshold: 
 
xv g
g g g t i t i t i + >
+ + - -
3
2 , 1 , ,  
 
we identify a boom in years t-2, t-1 and t.  
 
Conversely we identify a bust in years t-2, t-1 and t if  
 
xv g
g g g t i t i t i - <
+ + - -
3
2 , 1 , ,  
 
Our method detects a boom or a b ust when the three-year moving average of the 
growth rate in the asset price falls outside a confidence interval defined by reference to the 
historical first and second moments of the series. Variable x is a parameter that we calibrate so 
as to select the notorious boom-bust episodes without selecting (too many) spurious events. 
(We implement some sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter.) We use the three-year 
                                                             
6 Some data points are missing for some countries. The source for the stock price data is IFS, 
for property prices is BIS.   - 9 - 
  9
moving average so as to eliminate the high frequency variations in the series. (This i s 
particularly a problem with stock prices, which are more volatile than property prices.)  
 
For real property prices the average growth rate across the 15 countries is 1.1 percent 
with an average volatility of 5.8 percent. For real stock prices the growth rate and the volatility 





3.2 Boom – Busts in the OECD 1970-2001 
 
  Figures 7 and 8 show the log of the real prices of stocks and property
8, with the 
boom and bust periods marked with shaded and clear bars respectively. We define a boom- 
bust episode as a boom followed by a bust that starts no later than one-year after the end of the 
bust. For example, Sweden (1987-1994) exhibits a boom-bust in real property prices but 
Ireland (1977-1984) does not, because the boom and the bust are separated by a two-years 
interval (see Figure 7).We also show banking crises marked by an asterisk country by country.
9 
A few facts stand out. 
 
  First, boom-bust episodes are much more prevalent in property prices than in stock prices. 
Out of 24 boom episodes in stock prices only three are followed by busts: Finland (1988), Japan 
(1989), Spain (1988)
  10. (We give the last year of the boom in parentheses.) Hence the sample 
probability of a boom ending up in a bust is 12.5 percent. Of course Japan is a very significant 
boom-bust episode. Also there might be more boom-bust episodes in the making since it is too 
early to tell whether the recent slides in stock markets in all countries are busts.
11 
 
  Out of 19 booms in property prices, 10 were followed by busts: Denmark (1986), Finland 
(1989), Italy (1981), Japan (1973, 1990), the Netherlands (1977), Norway (1987), Sweden (1989), 
                                                             
7 We experimented with different values of x and the number of boom-bust episodes decline as 
x increases. Thus for property prices at x=1.0, there are 16 boom-bust and for stock prices 
there are 5. We settled on x =1.3 because lowering the threshold below that level produces an 
excessively large number of booms and busts.  
8 The logs were normalized to show only positive values. 
9 The data on banking crises come from Eichengreen and Bordo (2002). 
10 If we were to take a lower threshold such as x =1.0, then, two more countries would be listed 
as having boom-busts: Italy and Sweden.  
11 Note that the incidence of a boom-bust episode by our criterion is very different from what is 
usually referred to as a stock market crash. For the U.S. for example, Mishkin and White 
(2002) document 15 crashes 1900–2000 and 4 from 1970–2000. They define a crash as a 
20 percent decline in stock prices in a 12-month window.   - 10 - 
  10
and the United Kingdom (1973, 1989).
12 The probability of a boom in property prices ending up in 
a bust is 52.5 percent. That is, more than one in two property booms end up in a bust, against one 
in eight for stock market booms. Only two countries had boom-busts in both stock prices and 
property prices, Japan and Finland. In both cases the peaks virtually coincided. 
 
  One explanation for the larger number of boom-bust episodes in property prices than in 
stock prices may be that property price episodes are often local phenomenon occurring in the 
capital or major cities of a country. This would explain their high incidence in small countries like 
Finland or even in countries with relatively large populations like the U.K., where the episode 
occurred in London and environs. The fact that no such episodes are found in the U.S. may reflect 
the fact that boom-busts in property prices that occurred in New York, California and New 
England in the 1990’s washed out in a national average index. 
 
  Second, in a number of cases, banking crises occurred either at the peak of the boom or 
after the bust. This is most prominent in the cases of Japan  and the Nordic countries. 
 
  Finally, to provide historical perspective to our methodology, we do the same calculations 
for two U.S. stock price indexes for the last century: the S and P 500 from 1874 to 1999 and the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1900 – 1999. As can be seen in figures 9 and 10, there are 
very few boom-bust episodes. The crash of 1929 stands out in both figures. In the S and P we also 
identify a boom bust in 1884, the year of a famous Wall Street crash associated with speculation in 
railroad stocks and political corruption, and one in 1937, the start of the third most serious 
recession of the twentieth century.
13 As is well known the bust of 1929 is followed by banking 
crises in each of the years from 1930–1933. 
 
 
3.3 Ancillary Variables 
 
  Associated with the boom bust episodes for property and stock prices that we have isolated 
above, we display figures for three macro variables directly related to the asset price reversals: CPI 
inflation, the real output gap and domestic private credit.
14 The figures are averages of each 
variable across all the boom-bust episodes demarcated above. The 7-year time window shown is 
centered on the last year of the boom. 
 
  In figure 11 for property price boom- busts we observe inflation (panel A) rising until the 
year after the boom ends and then falling with the bust, while the output gap plateaus the year 
before the boom ends and then declines with the bust (panel B). Domestic private credit (panel C) 
                                                             
12 Again, a lower threshold of x =1.0 would add in Ireland and Spain. 
13 Using a lower threshold of x = 1.0 does not change the outcome. 
14 Private Credit, line 22d of IFS is defined as “claims on the private sector of Deposit Money 
Banks (which comprise commercial banks and other financial institutions that accept 
transferable deposits, such as demand deposits).”   - 11 - 
  11
continues to rise until the year after the boom peaks and then plateaus.
15 This pattern is remarkably 
consistent with the scenario relating asset price reversals to the incidence of collateral, to the credit 
available to liquidity constrained firms and to economic activity that we develop in section 
4 below. 
 
  Figure 12 shows the behavior of inflation, the output gap and domestic private credit 
averaged across the three boom-bust episodes in stock prices demarcated in figure 8. Inflation rises 
to a peak with the end of the boom and then declines, although not as precipitously as with the 
property price episodes (panel A). The output gap plateaus the year the boom ends and then 
declines in the bust (panel B). Domestic credit slows down its rate of increase the year after the 
boom ends and then declines (panel C). Although the pattern displayed for the 3 ancillary variables 
for stock price boom-busts is quite similar to that seen in figure 11, we attach more weight to the 
property price pattern because it is based on a much larger number of episodes (12 versus 3). 
 
  With this descriptive evidence as background, in section 4 below we develop a model to 
help us understand the relationship between boom-busts, the real economy and monetary policy. 
 
 
Section 4. Theory 
 
 
A regular feature of boom-bust episodes is that the fall in asset prices is associated with a 
slowdown in economic activity (sometimes negative growth), as well as financial and banking 
problems. There may be a number of explanations for this pattern, and they do not all give a 
central role to asset prices.
16 However, there is evidence that the bust in asset prices contributes 
to the fall in output by generating a credit crunch. The domestic private sector accumulates a 
high level of debt in the boom period; when asset prices fall, the collateral base shrinks, and so 
do firms’ ability to finance their operations.
17 
 
This section addresses the following question. Assuming that asset market booms involve the 
risk of a reversal in which the economy falls prey to a collateral-induced credit crunch, what is 
the consequence of this risk for the design of monetary policy? 
 
There are two ways in which monetary policy can respond. First, there is the reactive approach. 
The monetary authorities wait and see whether the asset collapse occurs, and if it does, respond 
accordingly. This is consistent with standard monetary policy rules, such as the Taylor rule, 
                                                             
15 The figure shows the nominal level of private domestic credit. Real private domestic credit 
declines in the year after the boom peaks. 
16 For example, bad news about future productivity could cause financial and banking 
problems at the same time as a slowdown in economic activity, without causality from the 
former to the latter. 
17 This meaning of a collateral-induced credit crunch differs from an earlier meaning which 
viewed a credit crunch as a restriction on bank lending induced by tightening monetary policy.    - 12 - 
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which imply an accommodating response ex post. If need be, this monetary relaxation can be 
complemented by a lending-in-last-resort injection of liquidity in order to stabilize the financial 
system (Bernanke and Gertler 2000). 
 
Second, there is a more pro-active approach to dealing with asset price developments. The 
monetary authorities might attempt to contain the rise in asset prices and domestic credit in the 
boom phase in the hope of mitigating the consequences of a bust, if it occurs. This may be 
consistent with standard monetary policy rules, which also imply a monetary restriction if the 
boom is associated with inflation pressures and overheating of the economy. However, the 
monetary authorities may want to restrict monetary policy above and beyond what standard 
rules prescribe. The question, then, is in which circumstances the authorities should deviate 
from standard rules, and on which indicators should they base monetary policy in these cases. 
 
This section presents a stylized model that clarifies the difference between the two views, and 
draws some implications for monetary policy. Unlike a number of related papers (Bernanke 
and Gertler, 2000; Batini and Nelson, 2000; Cecchetti et al, 2000), the aim is not to compare 
the performance of different monetary policy rules in the context of a realistic, calibrated 
model of the economy. Rather, it is to highlight the difference between a proactive monetary 
policy and a reactive monetary policy in the context of a simple and transparent framework. It 
turns out that although the model is quite simple, the optimal monetary policy is not trivial, and 
depends on the exogenous economic conditions in a non-linear way. Although this non-
linearity complicates the analysis, we think it is an essential feature of the question we study in 
this paper because financial crises are inherently non-linear events. We hope that in a second 
step, the approach can be transposed to more realistic models of the economy. 
 
Our analysis is based on a reduced-form model that is very close to the standard undergraduate 
text-book macroeconomic model. In the appendix we provide micro-foundations in the spirit of 
the “Dynamic New Keynesian” literature. Private agents have utility functions and optimize 
intertemporally. The government prints and distributes money, which is used because of a 
cash-in-advance constraint. Nominal wages are predetermined, giving rise to a short-run 
Phillips Curve. Monetary policy has a credit channel, based on collateral. The collateral is 
productive capital; its price is driven by the expected level of productivity in the long run.   
 
The reduced-form model has two periods  1 , 0 = t . Period 0 is the period in which the problem 
“builds up” (debt is accumulated). In period 1, the long-run level of productivity is revealed. 
An asset market crash may or not occur, depending on the nature of the news. If the long-run 
level of productivity is lower than expected, the price of the asset falls, reducing the collateral 
basis for new borrowing. If the price of collateral is excessively low relative to firms’ debt 
burden, the asset market crash provokes a credit crunch and a fall in real activity. 
 
Note that these market dynamics are completely driven by the arrival of news on long-run 
productivity. The asset market boom is not caused by a monetary expansion or a bubble. Nor is 
the crash caused by a monetary restriction, or a self-fulfilling liquidity crisis. Irrational 
expectations or multiple equilibria can be introduced into the model, but keeping in line with 
our desire to stay close to the textbook framework, we prefer to abstract from these 
considerations in the benchmark model. At the end of this section we briefly discuss a variant   - 13 - 
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of the model in which investors are “irrationally exuberant”. The appendix presents a variant of 
the model in which investors are rational but asset market crashes are self-fulfilling. 
 
 
4.1 The model 



















e a  
 
where  t y  is output at time t,  t m  is money supply,  t p  is the price level and r is the real interest 
rate between period 0 and period 1. All variables, except the real interest rate, are in logs. 
 
The first two equations characterizes aggregate demand and aggregate supply. Aggregate 
supply is increasing with the nominal price level because the nominal wage is sticky. The third 
equation says that the first-period output is decreasing with the real interest rate. It is based, in 
the micro-founded model, on the Euler equation for consumption.  
 
The key difference between our model and the standard macro model is the “supply shock”, e . 
In the standard model the supply shock is an exogenous technological shock or more generally, 
any exogenous event which affects the productivity of firms (e.g., an earthquake). Here the 
supply shock is instead a “financial” shock and it is not entirely exogenous, since its 
distribution depends on firms’ debt and the price of assets, two variables that monetary policy 
may influence. That monetary policy can influence debt accumulation ex ante (in period 0) 
plays a central role in our analysis of proactive monetary policy. 
 
The supply shock e  results from the occurrence of a credit crunch in the corporate sector. For 








crunch. credit    if    









In the micro-founded model, the occurrence of a credit crunch depends on two variables: the 
debt burden of the corporate sector and the price of collateral. Firms issue a quantity of debt D 
in period 0 and must repay  D r) 1 ( +  in period 1. (Debt is in real terms.) In addition, some firms 
must obtain new credit in period 1 to finance working capital. The firms that need but do not 
obtain this intra-period credit simply do not produce, which reduces aggregate supply.  
   - 14 - 
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In period 1, the firms’ access to new credit depends on the value of their collateral. Because of 
a debt renegotiation problem a la Hart and Moore (1994), firms’ total debt cannot exceed the 
value of their collateral. Denoting by  1 Q  the real value of collateral in period 1, and by g the 
required level of intra-period credit, the firms that require intra-period credit can operate if and 
only if  1 ) 1 ( Q D r £ + + g . There is a credit crunch if and only if this condition is not satisfied. 
 
g + + < D r Q ) 1 (   1             (4) 
 




4.2 Monetary policy and financial fragility 
 
Monetary policy influences the two key variables that determine the occurrence of a credit 
crunch in period 1. First, a monetary expansion ex post (in period 1) should increase the price 
of collateral and may, if it is large enough, relax the collateral constraint. This is the ex post 
credit channel of monetary policy
18. Second, and more interestingly, a monetary restriction ex 
ante (in period 0) can reduce the accumulation of corporate debt D. This is the ex ante credit 
channel of monetary policy. Indeed, containing firms’ debt burden is the purpose of a proactive 
monetary policy in our framework. For simplicity, we abstract from the ex post channel  by 
assuming that the ex post real price of collateral is exogenous to monetary policy.
19  
 
The probability that the economy falls in a credit crunch is a measure of its financial fragility. 
We denote this probability by m . It is equal to the probability that the price of collateral falls 
below the threshold defined in equation (4): 
 
] ) 1 ( Pr[ 1 D r Q + + < = g m               (5) 
 
The probability of a credit crunch is increasing with the ex post debt burden,  D r) 1 ( + . In turn, 
the level of firms’ borrowing in period 0, D, is a decreasing function of r . For a monetary 
restriction in period 0 (a rise in r) to reduce the probability of a credit crunch, the debt burden 
D r) 1 ( +  must be decreasing with r . That is, the semi-elasticity of firms’ borrowing with 
respect to the real interest rate should be lower than –1. The model in the appendix satisfies 
this property, since it yields the expression: 
 
K r Q E D r ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 0 + - = +              (6) 
 
                                                             
18 Note that if corporate debt were nominal, the ex post credit channel would involve another 
effect. A monetary expansion would contribute to relax the collateral constraint by inflating 
away a fraction of the debt. 
19 This result is obtained, in the micro-founded model, by assuming that households’ utility is 
linear in period 1.   - 15 - 
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where  K is the level of firms’ equity. The debt burden is linearly increasing with the expected 
price of collateral, and linearly decreasing with the real interest rate. Hence we have that the 







                  (7) 
 
 
This result is central to our analysis: a preemptive monetary restriction at period 0 reduces the 
risk of a credit crunch at period 1. The monetary restriction reduces the debt accumulated by 
firms, and so makes them more resilient to negative shocks in the price of collateral.  
 
4.3 Reactive and proactive monetary policies 
 
As noted earlier, the difference between our model and the standard textbook model is that the 
distribution of supply shocks at period 1 is endogenous to monetary policy at period 0. We call 
a proactive monetary policy a policy that is geared towards avoiding a credit crunch in period 
1. This is by contrast with a reactive policy, that simply responds to a credit crunch if it 
occurs—making no difference between a credit crunch and a standard supply shock. 
 
A pro-active monetary policy involves a trade-off between the level of output in period 0 and 
the risk of a credit crunch in period 1. The risk of a credit crunch can be reduced by a monetary 













By contrast with a  reactive monetary policy, a proactive monetary policy is determined in the 
context of a trade-off between period 0 policy objectives in terms of output and prices, and the 
risk of a credit crunch in period 1. 
 
In order to investigate this trade-off one has to endow the monetary authorities with an 
intertemporal objective function. We assume that the government minimizes the following 




2 2 ￿ + =
= t




4.4 A non-conventional, non-linear Taylor rule 
 
We now illustrate the difference between proactive and reactive monetary policies with a 
specification of the model that draws on the recent debates on the “New Economy” and the 
stock market. Assume that in the second period, the price of collateral can take two values, a   - 16 - 
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high level,  H Q , corresponding to the “New Economy” scenario, and a low level,  L Q , 
corresponding to the “Old Economy” scenario. Viewed from period 0, the probability of the 
“New Economy” scenario is a measure of the optimism of economic agents. We denote it by 
NE P , and by  NE OE P P - =1 the probability of the Old Economy scenario.  
 
The realization of the “Old Economy” scenario is associated with a fall in asset prices and 
possibly, a credit crunch. By equation (4), a credit crunch occurs in the event of the realization 
of the “Old Economy” scenario if  g + + < D r QL ) 1 ( . Substituting out D with equation (6) and 
noting that  L NE H NE Q P Q P Q E ) 1 ( ) ( 1 0 - + =  , the condition for a credit crunch can be written 
 
). ( ) 1 ( L H NE Q Q P r K - ￿ + < + g             (11) 
 
A credit crunch is more likely to occur ex post if private agents are more confident in the “New 
Economy” ex ante ( NE P  is large), because firms borrow more. It is also more likely if the asset 
price differential between the “New Economy” and the “Old Economy” is large.  
 
The authorities can maintain the probability of a credit crunch at its minimum level of 0 by 










            (12) 
 
This rule implies that the monetary authorities should respond to rising confidence in the 
“New Economy” (an increase in  NE P ) by restricting monetary policy (raising r ). 
Note the difference with standard rules, such as the Taylor rule. Standard rules make the 
monetary authorities respond to the current or expected levels of macroeconomic variables 
such as the output gap or the inflation rate. The rule above suggests that the monetary 
policymaker should respond to prospective developments in asset markets, for which 
macroeconomic aggregates do not provide appropriate summary statistics. 
 
It is not clear, however, that the authorities always wish to reduce the probability of a credit  
crunch to zero. The required level of the real interest rate may be excessively high. There is a 
threshold r  above which the authorities prefer to take the risk of a credit crunch, and respond 
ex post if need be—that is, to be reactive rather than proactive.  
 
By adopting a reactive approach, the government can set its loss to zero in the first period, but 
takes the risk of incurring a strictly positive loss in the second period if a credit crunch occurs. 




2 y p w +  under the constraint 




2 wa wa wa + - = + = v y v p  and the loss is equal to 
) 1 /(
2 2 wa w + v .
20 The intertemporal loss is equal to the probability of a credit crunch,  OE P , 
times the loss conditional on a credit crunch 
                                                             
20 The credit crunch increases the price level because it reduces supply without changing 












P L OE reactive               (13) 
 
By contrast, if the government raises the real interest rate to the level implied by (12) in order 
to avoid a credit crunch, ouput and prices are depressed below the target levels in period 1. 
One has  a s s / , 1 1 r p r y - = - = , so that the authorities have to suffer a loss of  
 












Lproactive               (14) 
 
The government adopts a proactive policy if  reactive proactive L L < . Simple computations show 










” £             (15) 
 
The maximum real interest rate that the government is ready to bear in order to forestall a 
credit crunch is increasing with the probability of a credit crunch,  OE P , and with the output 
cost of a credit crunch, v . It is decreasing with the sensitivity of output to the real interest rate, 
s . 
 
Figure 13 illustrates how the optimal monetary policy depends on the optimism of the private 
sector. It shows how the real interest rate  r , the first-period level of output and prices, 
0 0   and   p y , and the level of domestic credit  D, depend on the probability of realization of the 
“New Economy” scenario. The figure was constructed for the following values of the 
parameters:  % 10 , 2 / 1 , 4 / 1 , 2 / 1 , 3 / 200 , 75 , 75 , 100 = = = = = = = = v K Q Q L H w s a g . 
The price of collateral is 25 percent lower in the “Old Economy” scenario than in the “New 
Economy” one. A credit crunch is associated with a 10 percent drop in output. The elasticity of 
first-period output with respect to the real interest rate is 0.25 (i.e., a 1 percent rise in the real 
interest rate depresses first-period output by 0.25 percent). 
 
As the private sector’s optimism increases, the economy goes through three different phases. 
First, if  NE P  is low (lower than 33 percent in the figure), firms’ borrowing is sufficiently low 
that the realization of the “Old Economy” scenario is not associated with a credit crunch. In 
this case, the government adopts a reactive policy because there is no reason to be proactive. If 
NE P  takes intermediate values (between 33 and 60 percent in the figure), the government 
restricts monetary policy in a proactive way. Finally, if  NE P  is high, the government reverts to 
a reactive stance, even though there is a risk that the economy falls in a credit crunch. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
credit constrained—the credit crunch would also reduce demand (making the model more 
consistent with the evidence that busts are deflationary, see figures 11 and 12) .   - 18 - 
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reason is that, given the private sector’s high level of optimism, the government would have to 
raise the real interest rate to an excessive level in order to insure the economy against a credit 
crunch. At the same time, the benefit of the proactive policy is lower since the credit crunch is 
less likely to occur. Leaning against the market has higher costs and lower benefits. The 
proactive policy dominates for intermediate levels of “market exuberance”. 
 
The model highlights both the potential benefits and the limits of a proactive monetary policy. 
It may be optimal, in some circumstances, to sacrifice some output in order to reduce the risk 
of a collateral-induced credit crunch. However, there are also circumstances in which the 
domestic authorities are better off accepting the risk of a credit crunch (i.e., a reactive policy). 
Whether the authorities should in practice engage in a proactive policy at a particular time is 
contingent on many factors, and is a matter of judgment. In our model, the optimal monetary 
policy depends on the observable macroeconomic variables, and on the private sector’s 
expectations, in a highly non-linear way. This suggests to us that the optimal monetary policy 
probably does not take the form of a simple mechanical rule such as the Taylor rule, even if it 
is augmented by a linear term in asset prices. Which form it should take in practice is difficult 
to assess on the basis of our very stylized model. Further theoretical and empirical work is 
needed before we can assess with some confidence the scope for proactive monetary policies. 
 
4.5 Irrational exuberance 
 
To conclude this section, let us re-emphasize that our analysis of proactive monetary policy is 
not premised on the assumption that asset prices deviate from their fundamental values. The 
essential variable, from the point of view of policymaking is the risk of a credit crunch induced 
by an asset market reversal. This assessment can be made based on the historical record (as 
illustrated in sections 2 and 3), as well as information specific to each episode. In particular, 
the suspicion that an asset market boom is a bubble which will have to burst at some point is an 
important input in this assessment. However, bubbles are not of the essence of the question 
since, as our model shows,  the question would arise even in a world without bubbles. Hence, 
the debate about proactive versus reactive monetary policies should not be reduced to a debate 
over the central bank’s ability to recognize a bubble when it sees one.  
 
Going back to our model, the notion of irrational expectations can be captured by assuming 
that private agents base their decisions, in period 0, on an excessively optimistic assessment of 
the probability of the “New Economy” scenario. Let us assume that firms borrow in period 0 
on the basis of a probability 
'
NE P  which is larger than the true probability  NE P . The monetary 
authorities base instead their policy on the true probability.  
 
Figure 14 shows the optimal monetary policy as a function of the private sector’s optimism 
(measured by 
'
NE P ), assuming that the monetary authorities keep their own estimate at 
1 . 0 = NE P . Otherwise, the calibration is the same as in Figure 13. The real interest rate 
required by the proactive monetary policy is exactly the same as before, since it is dictated by 
the expectations of the market, not those of the central bank. However, the proactive monetary 
policy is maintained for higher levels of market optimism than before, because this optimism is   - 19 - 
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not shared by the monetary authorities. Hence irrational exuberance broadens the scope for 
proactive monetary policy.  
 
 
Section 5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
The analysis in this paper suggests that boom-busts in asset prices can be very costly in terms 
of declining output. This was clearly the case in the U.S. Great Depression and in the recent 
Japanese experience. We also argue that there is a case under certain circumstances to use 
monetary policy in a proactive way to restrict private domestic credit and diffuse an asset price 
boom to prevent a credit crunch. 
 
The consensus view among policy makers today however, is not to pursue such a course but 
rather to follow a reactive policy and deal with the consequences of an asset price bust after it 
happens. Our paper we believe suggests that the case for a proactive policy is a real issue—that 
the current strategy of following a Taylor rule that focuses the policy instrument exclusively on 
deviations from inflation forecasts and the output gap—and then injecting liquidity ex post in 
the event of a credit crunch, may in certain circumstances be more costly in terms of lost 
output than a proactive policy incorporating asset prices directly into the central bank’s 
objective function. In a sense had the Federal Reserve  followed the views of Strong and later 
Harrison and defused  the stock market boom in 1928 rather than following the policies that it 
did, the outcome would have been very different. A similar conjecture could be made about the 
Bank of Japan’s policy in the late 1980s. 
 
Our analysis in this paper should be interpreted as being mainly suggestive because we do not 
provide empirical estimates of the magnitude of the output losses under the alternative policy 
strategies. To do this would require either simulating the effects of alternative policy rules in 
an econometric model or in a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model that would involve 
the kind of non-linearity we have emphasized in this paper. These are topics for future 
research. 
 
Finally the descriptive evidence that we present shows that stock market boom-busts 
are rare events, whereas property boom-busts are quite frequent. This suggests prima facie that 
the case for a proactive policy may be more telling to deal with property price credit crunches. 
Since these events occur quite regularly in the smaller countries of Europe this issue may pose 
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The model has three periods  2 , 1 , 0 = t (one period more than the reduced-form model). The last period is added so 
as to endogenize the price of the asset. There are two types of private agents: households and entrepreneurs. There 
is a continuum of mass 1 of each type. Households supply labor and funds to entrepreneurs, who produce an 
homogeneous consumption good. We assume that there is a fixed quantity of productive capital in the economy. 
Capital does not depreciate and it cannot be reproduced. Productive capital can be though of as “land”, and the 
consumption good as “fruit”.  
 
Households are identical and live for three periods. Their intertemporal utility is given by: 
 
                                                         ) 1 ( ) ( 2 1 0 A C C C u U h + + =  
 
where  t C denotes the representative household’s consumption of fruit, and  ) (￿ u  is increasing and concave. 
 
Entrepreneurs live in the first two periods  1 , 0 = t . They have a native ability to combine land with labor to 
produce fruit. We assume that each entrepreneur operates exactly one unit of land. When combined with  t L  units 
of labor, one unit of land yields: 
 
units of good ( ) 1 , 0 ( ˛ h ). 
 
We assume that in the last period entrepreneurs are no longer required in the production process. The production 
process in period 2 is the same as in Lucas’ “tree economy”: each unit of land yields an exogenous quantity of 
good, denoted by R. This assumption captures the idea that in the long run the economy reaches a state of 
equilibrium where the type of financial disruption that we focus on no longer matters. Variable R may be 
interpreted as the long-run productivity of capital. Its value is unknown at time 0 and is revealed at time 1. 
 
At time 0 the productive asset (land) is owned by households. The entrepreneurs must take possession of the asset 
in order to produce but they do not have enough cash. We assume that the entrepreneurs finance the purchase of 
the asset by issuing debt. Let  0 Q  be the real price of the asset in period 0. At the beginning of period 0 each 
entrepreneur is endowed with K and borrows  K Q D - = 0 . 
 
Entrepreneurs produce in periods 0 and 1. We assume that in period 1, entrepreneurs must borrow “inside the 
period” to finance working capital. This can be justified by the fact that inside the period, production takes time, 
and some production inputs that are immobilized in the production process must be financed by credit. The 
entrepreneurs that do not manage to obtain the intra-period credit are inactive—they do not produce. In general 
the intra-period credit requirement could differ across entrepreneurs, for example because of idiosyncratic shocks 
in the production process. The real value of the credit required by entrepreneur j is denoted by  ) ( j g . 
 
We further assume that entrepreneurs’ debt is subject to a re-negotiation problem a la Hart and Moore (1994) and 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). An entrepreneur has the option to walk away with the output after production has 
taken place, leaving the asset for his creditors to seize. The entrepreneur walks away after production has taken 
place in period 1 if and only if his total debt (the repayment of the period 0 loan contracted to purchase the 
productive asset, plus the intra-period credit) exceeds the value of collateral. If creditors anticipate that the 
entrepreneur will default they do not provide the intra-period credit and the entrepreneur cannot operate. Hence 
the entrepreneur can operate if and only if the required intra-period credit is lower than the net value of the firm, 
i.e. if: 
 
) 3 A ( D ) r 1 ( 1 Q ) j ( + - < g  
) 2 ( , 1 , 0 , 1 A t L y t t = =
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At the level of the entrepreneur, this constraint is of the “all-or-nothing” type. If it is not satisfied the entrepreneur 
is simply inactive and the asset is sold at the end of the period. If it is satisfied the entrepreneur operates free of 
credit constraint. We assume that the proceeds of the sale are always sufficient to repay the period 0 lenders (i.e., 
D r Q ) 1 ( 1 + ‡ ), so that there is no default risk in equilibrium. 
 
One has to make an assumption on the distribution of the intra-period credit requirement across entrepreneurs. For 
simplicity we assume that there are two types of entrepreneurs: some need a level g  of intra-period credit and the 
others do not need intra-period credit at all. Denoting by f  the fraction of entrepreneurs of the first type, the 
number of active entrepreneurs at period 1,  1 N , is given by: 
 
) 4 A (
D ) r 1 ( 1 Q    if    1




g < + - f - =
g ‡ + - =
 
 
In periods 0 and 1, after production has taken place there is a financial market in which households exchange 
consumption good, money, IOUs, and the productive asset. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that 
entrepreneurs do not participate in the financial market. (This is necessarily true in period 1 because entrepreneurs 
consume their end-of-life wealth.) Hence in period 0 the real price of the asset results from the first-order 
conditions of the inter-temporal optimization problem of households 
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The utility function being linear in periods 1 and 2, the price of the asset at period 1 is simply equal to its final 
return: 
 
) 7 ( 1 A R Q =  
 
Money is used by households in periods 0 and 1. Money demand results from a cash-in-advance constraint: 
 
The domestic government prints and transfers money to households in a lump-sum way. For simplicity we assume 
that the government makes the consumption of households equal to that of entrepreneurs by lump-sum transfers, 
so that the consumption of the representative households is proportional to aggregate output: 
 
) 9 (A Y C t t l =  
 
(where l  is equal to ½ since there is the same number of entrepreneurs and households). 
 
We assume that the nominal wage levels of periods 0 and 1,  1 0   and   W W , are preset at the beginning of period 0, 
before  1 0   and   M M  are known. For simplicity, we take the nominal wages as exogenous to the analysis.  
 
The labor market is perfectly competitive. Aggregate supply at time t is equal to the number of active 
entrepreneurs times the supply per active entrepreneur. An active entrepreneur produces 
h h h
/ ) 1 ( ) ) 1 /( (
- - - P W , 
while inactive entrepreneurs produce nothing. Hence aggregate supply can be written 
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where   h h a / ) 1 ( - ”  is the elasticity of aggregate supply with respect to the real wage. 
 
Leaving aside unimportant constants, the model can be written in log form like in the text (equation (2)), with 
t t N log = e . We have  0 = t e , except in period 1 if there is a credit crunch, in which case  ) 1 log( 1 f e - ” - = v . 
 
It results from  K Q D - = 0 and the first-order conditions (A5)-(A6) that the debt burden in period 1 is: 
 
) 11 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 0 A r K Q E D r + - = +  
 
(equation (6) in the text.) 
 
We conclude by presenting a variant of the model in which credit crunches can be self-fulfilling, which gives 
scope for a form of lending-in-last-resort policy. Assume now that households’ utility is concave in period 1 
consumption, that is, equation (A1) is replaced by 
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The period 1 price of the asset must now satisfy 
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Substituting out  1 P  from (A8) and (A10) and using  1 1 Y C l = , aggregate supply can be written as a function of 
the number of active firms 
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An equilibrium without a credit crunch can coexist with an equilibrium with a credit crunch. To see this, let us 
denote by  H Y  and  H Q  the levels of output and asset price in the equilibrium without a credit crunch and by  L Y  
and  L Q  the analogs in the equilibrium with a credit crunch. One has  ) 1 /( 1 ) 1 ( a f k k + - = > = L H Y Y  and 
) ( ' / ) ( ' / L L H H Y u R Q Y u R Q l l = > = . Output and the price of the asset are both lower in the equilibrium with 
a credit crunch.  
 
For both equilibria to exist one must have  L H Q D r Q > + + ‡ ) 1 ( g . The price of collateral in the credit-crunch 
equilibrium must be sufficiently low so as to provoke a credit crunch, and sufficiently high in the no-credit-crunch 
equilibrium so as to avoid a credit crunch. The intuition behind the multiplicity involves the following vicious 
circle. A fall in the price of collateral reduces aggregate supply and consumption; households’ attempt to sell the 
asset (in order to smooth consumption intertemporally) then depresses the price of the asset in equilibrium.  
 
The bad equilibrium is removed if the monetary authorities peg the price of the asset at the good equilibrium level 
H Q1 . This requires a promise by the monetary authorities to inject money into the economy would it threaten to 
switch to the bad equilibrium, a policy that can be interpreted as a form of lending-in-last-resort.  The United States
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 Figure 3. Bank Loans: Total, Secured by Securities, and Secured by Real Estate 1921-1941.
Source: 
Federal Reserve Banking and Monetary Statistics (1943).Japan
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 Figure 6. Bank Loans: Total, Secured by Securities and other Assets and Secured by Real Estate, 1982-
1998.
Source: 
Bordo, Ito and Iwaisako (1997). Figure 7. Boom-Bust in Residential Property Prices, 1970-1998 **
Sources:
Bank of International Settlements; International Financial Statisticsand World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund. 
*Banking crisis. See Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) Appendix A. 
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1Figure 7. Boom-Bust in Residential Property Prices,1970-1998**
Sources:
Bank of International Settlements; International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund. 
*Banking crisis. See Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) Appendix A. 

























































90*Figure 7. Boom-Bust in Residential Property Prices, 1970-1998**
Sources:
Bank of International Settlements; International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund. 
*Banking crisis. See Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) Appendix A. 





















































77*Figure 7. Boom-Bust in Residential Property Prices, 1970-1998**
Sources:
Bank of International Settlements; International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund. 
*Banking crisis. See Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) Appendix A. 














































*84Figure 8. Boom-Bust in Industrial Share Prices, 1970-2001**
Sources:
International Financial Statistics, World Economic Outlook and country desks, International Monetary Fund.
*Banking crisis. See Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) Appendix A. 





















































*91Figure 8. Boom-Bust in Industrial Share Prices, 1970-2001**
Source:
International Financial Statistics, World Economic Outlook and country desks, International Monetary Fund.
*Banking crisis. See Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) Appendix A. 






















































*90Figure 8. Boom-Bust in Industrial Share Prices, 1970-2001**
Source:
International Financial Statistics, World Economic Outlook and country desks, International Monetary Fund.
*Banking crisis. See Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) Appendix A. 






















































*77Figure 8. Boom-Bust in Industrial Share Prices, 1970-2001**
Sources:
International Financial Statistics, World Economic Outlook and country desks, International Monetary Fund.
*Banking crisis. See Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) Appendix A. 












































Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial Edition (2003)
*Banking crisis. See Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) Appendix A. ** Booms and busts are calculated by a three year moving average. 


































Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial Edition (2003)
*Banking crisis. See Eichengreen and Bordo (2002) Appendix A. ** Booms and busts are calculated by a three year moving average. Figure 11. Ancillary Variables: Boom-Bust in Property Prices
Sources:



































t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3Figure 12. Ancillary Variables: Boom-Bust in Stock Prices
Source:
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